By Mark Alfano
Every body desires to be virtuous, yet fresh mental investigations recommend that this would possibly not be attainable. Mark Alfano demanding situations this idea and asks, now not even if personality is empirically sufficient, yet what characters humans can have and advance. even though psychology means that most folks would not have strong personality characteristics corresponding to braveness, honesty and open-mindedness, Alfano argues that we've got cause to characteristic those virtues to humans simply because such attributions functionality as self-fulfilling prophecies – teenagers turn into extra studious in the event that they are instructed that they're hard-working and adults turn into extra beneficiant in the event that they are instructed that they're beneficiant. He argues that we must always consider advantage and personality as social constructs: there is not any such factor as advantage with out social reinforcement. His unique and provocative publication will curiosity a variety of readers in modern ethics, epistemology, ethical psychology and empirically proficient philosophy.
Read or Download Character as Moral Fiction PDF
Similar ethics books
This e-book supplies an in-depth philosophical research of ethical difficulties to which details know-how offers upward push, for instance, difficulties on the topic of privateness, highbrow estate, accountability, friendship, and belief, with contributions from a few of the best-known philosophers writing within the quarter.
'Imagine which you could opt for a e-book that everybody on the earth may learn. My selection will be this publication. ' - Roger Crisp, Ethics
'As Peter Singer wrote, "The challenge is that almost all humans have simply the vaguest suggestion of what it'd be to steer a moral lifestyles. They comprehend ethics as a method of principles forbidding us to do issues. they don't snatch it as a foundation for puzzling over how we're to dwell. They reside principally self-interested lives, now not simply because they have been born egocentric, yet as the possible choices appear awkward, embarrassing, or simply undeniable unnecessary. they can not see any approach of creating an influence at the global, and in the event that they may well, why should still they trouble? ' -- Midwest e-book Review
Many humans have an uneasy feeling that they're lacking out on whatever uncomplicated that will provide their lives a importance it presently lacks. yet how may still we are living? what's there to prevent us behaving selfishly? In a hugely readable account which makes connection with a wide selection of resources and daily matters, Peter Singer means that the normal pursuit of self-interest is separately and jointly self-defeating. making an allowance for the ideals of Jesus, Kant, Rousseau, and Adam Smith among others, he seems at a couple of various cultures, together with the US, Japan, and the Aborigines to evaluate even if selfishness is in our genes and the way we might locate larger pride in a moral lifestyle.
Singer means that those that take a moral way of living usually stay away from the seize of meaninglessness, discovering a deeper delight in what they're doing than these humans whose objectives are narrower and extra self-centered. He spells out what he potential by way of a moral lifestyle and exhibits that it may lead to major and far-reaching adjustments to one's lifestyles. How Are We to reside? explores the way commonplace modern assumptions approximately human nature and self-interest have ended in an international that's fraught with social and environmental difficulties. Singer asks even if selfishness is in our genes and concludes that we don't have to simply accept the awful view of human nature occasionally believed to be inevitable, given our evolutionary origins.
This short, based e-book introduces scholars and basic readers to philosophy via middle questions and issues - fairly these related to ethics, the life of God, loose will, the relation of brain and physique, and what it's to be someone. It additionally encompasses a bankruptcy on reasoning, either theoretical and useful, that develops an account of either cogent logical reasoning and rational decision-making.
Morality Play is a perfect complement for ethics classes, delivering a case learn procedure that's either versatile and useful. It offers 3 replacement tools of association for common educating techniques: modern ethical difficulties, moral theories, and ethical ideas. The advent illustrates the right way to successfully use case stories within the lecture room and gives a quick evaluate of the basics of argumentation and significant considering.
- Global Violence: Ethical and Political Issues (Global Ethics)
- Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition (Bradford Books)
- Normative Ethics (Dimensions of Philosophy)
- The Care of Life: Transdisciplinary Perspectives in Bioethics and Biopolitics
- Firms of Endearment: How World-Class Companies Profit from Passion and Purpose
- Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics
Additional info for Character as Moral Fiction
Like Russell (2009) and Badhwar (1996), I find the thick version of the integration thesis heroic but implausible. Furthermore, since the normative version is not implicated in any of the arguments for virtue ethics discussed above, it seems to be outside the hard core of virtue ethics. 34 Factitious Moral Virtue To sum up then, the following set of claims constitutes what I consider to be the hard core of virtue ethics: (acquirability) It is possible for a non-virtuous person to acquire some of the virtues.
By saying, “Because it produces good consequences” or “Because it’s in accordance with the rules,” would not motivate the moral acolyte. To answer it by saying, “Because you’re honest [or respectful, or diligent, or whatever],” would motivate. As I mentioned above, this one-sided presentation is intended not as a decisive argument in favor of virtue ethics but as motivation for the thought that virtue ethics has much to offer, perhaps even more to offer than its competitors. The question remains, though, whether virtue ethics is empirically and theoretically adequate.
Temptations make it hard to be virtuous, but this isn’t news. Perhaps the psychological evidence shows that temptations are even stronger than we tend to assume, but that is merely a matter of degree. If bad reasons were the only difficulty raised by situationism, it wouldn’t be a devastating challenge. In the next section, I discuss situational non-reasons, which I take to be the heart of the situationist challenge. 2 Situational non-reasons While it may be possible for virtue ethicists to find a place for temptations and situational demand characteristics in their moral psychology, For a more detailed analysis of the Milgram studies in obedience, see Chapter 8.