By Matthew Jones
An exam of the controversies and disputes produced among Britain and the USA via their joint involvement within the Mediterranean theatre throughout the moment global conflict. research of the evolution of Allied approach towards the Mediterranean is placed along a attention of the behavior of army campaigns and the command constructions that followed them. The political tensions permeating Anglo-American family, and the real function performed the following by way of Harold Macmillan, also are mentioned to supply an entire photograph of the issues confronted by means of the alliance.
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Extra info for Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942–44
Warnings delivered to London from the JSM, that this difficult issue would have to be re-opened with the Americans once more, were initially given dismissive treatment by the COS, but the British were soon finding themselves having to return to basic strategic principles as the transformation in US attitudes became all the more apparent. 35 In any event, by the autumn of 1942 the COS and Joint Planners were beginning to search for a strategy to produce the defeat of the enemy with which to guide their recommendations on future operations for the coming year.
Receiving the news that an attack on Tunis could not now be expected for two months, Brooke lamented: 'I am afraid that Eisenhower as a General is hopeless! ' Some months later, when Montgomery first encountered Eisenhower, he would conclude: 'A nice chap and probably quite good in the political line. But his knowledge of how to make war, or how to fight battles, is definitely NIL. He must be kept right away from all that sort of thing - otherwise we shall lose the war. ,23 The British considered that it was really only the influence of the authoritative Bedell Smith that prevented Eisenhower's shortcomings from being revealed to all at AFHQ; indeed, Montgomery would judge Bedell Smith 'the real power behind the throne.
In the euphoria of success at this first example of a large-scale Allied combined operation, embarrassing incidents and shortcomings could be easily overlooked; yet as Brigadier General Lucian K. Truscott, leading his US division in Morocco, was later prepared to admit, it was more a ' ... ' Moreover, in ominous fashion German air and ground units rapidly began to arrive at Tunisian airfields and ports soon after 'Torch' began (as the Joint Planners in London had predicted) and prepared to defend the lines of communication of the German forces retreating before General Montgomery's victorious 8th Army many hundreds of miles to the east.